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In modern regulatory state, the government has to deal with the so-called ‘risk’ issues. We 
are all surrounded by many different types of risks like climate change, bird flu, mad cow 
disease, genetically modified food, nuclear energy, etc., just name a few. The reason why modern 
administrative law is under a big challenge in dealing with those risk issues is that the 
government has to make policy choice under uncertainty. Compared to the traditional role of 
state like police administration and social benefit administration, the role of government in risk 
administration is much complicated and dynamic. 
In this paper, I would like to address the issue of how people and governments in modern 
administrative state can reach rational choice in dealing with risk management. The idea of 
democracy is based upon the rational choice of each individual participating political process. 
However, if, for some reason, people cannot fully understand what is going on and what kind of 
options they have, then, it is not easy for them to make rational choice in expressing their 
political preferences. Which naturally brings about the difficulty of government in setting 
appropriate policy measures in modern administrative law. With the interdisciplinary 
contribution of psychology, economics, and law, we now know that there are several human 
behavioral biases that are affecting the process of rational choice of individuals in forming their 
political preferences. Availability heuristic, cascading effect, group polarization, framing effect, 
hindsight bias, etc. are the major examples of those behavioral biases.
In this paper, I will try to show how those behavioral biases are affecting the process of 
individuals’ political preference formation, explain what should be the main concern of modern 
administrative law to minimize the adverse effects of those possible irrationality of people in 
building up social preference function, and provide my own view on those topics.
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I. The two cases in Korea
1. Mad cow disease gale in 2008
In early 2008, when the new president Lee Myung-bak government first 
began to negotiate with U.S. government on the import of U.S. beef, 
nobody expected that Korean society would fall into such a chaotic turmoil 
surrounding that issue. From April of 2008 to the end of that year, more 
than 1,000,000 people joined the protest against the import of U.S. beef into 
Korean territory. Their claim was that eating U.S. imported beef could put 
the people who ate the beef under the risk of being caught with mad cow 
disease. 
The protest reached its peak after MBC (Mun-hwa Broadcasting 
Company), which is one of the major broadcasting companies in Korea, 
broadcasted an investigative program on human being mad cow disease. 
The film was full of images showing how dangerous it could be to eat mad 
cow diseased beef. Originally, the protest against beef had quite political 
aspect. It could have been regarded as designed by liberalist groups who 
were against the president Lee’s government. However, after the MBC 
program was on air, the number of participants into the protest grew very 
rapidly including just young housewives and children. They were using 
pickets like “I don’t want to die!”1)  
As the possibility of human being mad cow disease had somewhat 
scientifically uncertain aspect, nobody could strongly persuade the people 
on the street to take it easy and go back home, even the president.
The country was falling into just a big chaotic turmoil of fear and anger. 
After all, it turned out scientifically that the U.S. imported beef is 
officially safe from mad cow disease for human being, and as of now in 
2012, many Korean people are enjoying the steaks made of beef imported 
1) About the story and image of the protest reported in the media, please confer following 
articles. Sang-hun Choe, Korean Leader Considers Ways to Rework Government, The New 
York Times, June 11. 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2008/06/10/
world/0610-KOREA_index.html?_r=0; http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/world/
asia/11korea.html?pagewanted=all.
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from U.S.2)
2. Cheon-seong mountain tunneling case in 2004
In 2004, the Korean government tried to make a tunnel at Cheon-seong 
mountain for the newly constructed KTX (Korean Train Express) from 
Seoul to Busan. The research outcome done by the government shows that 
the tunneling of Chen-seong mountain is the shortest cut and the most cost 
effective route to connect from Daegu (until which KTX had already been 
built from Seoul) to Busan. Somewhat suddenly, a female monk named 
Jiyul who were living a monastic life in a temple at the Chen-seong 
mountain claimed against the building of KTX tunnel and began to stage 
hunger strike against the government.3)
Monk Jiyul and several environmental groups supporting her claimed 
that once the tunnel is made in that mountain area then it will destroy the 
habitat of the Onychodactylus fisheri Boulenger (Korean clawed 
salamander).
The hunger strike of monk Jiyul drew people’s attention on that issue 
and fired cross-national debate on the validity of tunneling the mountain. 
As the period of Jiyul’s hunger strike gets longer and the disagreeing 
opinions against the tunneling grew bigger, the government temporarily 
stopped the construction and vowed to do again the environment impact 
assessment (EIS).
It was estimated that per each day of stopping the construction, the 
2) After the gale of mad cow disease passed by, the producers of the MBC investigative 
program “PD Sucheop(meaning ‘diary’ or ‘memo’ in Korean)” were indicted on charges of 
defamation. However, the Supreme Court of Korea ruled that they are not guilty on the basis 
of the freedom of speech principle. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Do17237, Sep. 2, 2011 (S. 
Kor.). 
3) About the detailed story on the protest, please confer following media articles. Sun-
young Lee, Nun Jiyul hunger strike at 100-day mark, The Korea herald, Feb 2. 2005, available at 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=108&oid=044&a
id=0000049055; Hyun-jung Bae, Environmentalist monk wins 10 won in court case, The Korea 
herald, Sep. 4, 2009, available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=se
c&sid1=104&oid=044&aid=0000084940; In the Wake of Jiyul’s Hunger Strike, The hanKyoreh, 
Aug 26. 2004, available at http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1
=001&oid=028&aid=0000075270 
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construction cost would rise with the rate of about KRW 7,000,000,000 
(which approximately equals to US $ 7,000,000) everyday.
After all, it took months and months to finish the new EIS and lawsuits 
raised in relation to the dispute and finally to finish the construction of KTX 
from Seoul to Busan through the Cheon-seong mountain tunnel.4)
As of now in 2012, many Korean people are happy to use KTX from 
Seoul to Busan with shortened time. And, somewhat ironically, some 
scientific research report says that compared to the time when the tunnel 
was not built, the number of Korean clawed salamander in that area was 
raised.5)
II. Rational Choice in Modern Administrative Law
1. Introduction
In modern administrative state, finding out the proper role of state is 
not as simple as it used to be in the police state. During the era of police 
state, the proper role of government was relatively simple. The 
governments were well to do if they could keep the peaceful state of the 
society. The public administrative goal was mostly evident and simple. 
They were required to arrest burglars and to protect the territory of state 
from foreign invasion. Of course, due to the scarcity of resources, the 
governments could not fulfill every requirement from people, but still in 
that case, the administrative goals and the administrative means to achieve 
those goals were quite evident and simply correlated with each other.
Compared to that, the proper role of modern administrative state is 
4) The Supreme Court finally dismissed the petitions from environment group to stop the 
construction of the tunnel in the following decision. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Ma1148 & 
2004Ma1149 (consol.), Jun. 2, 2006 (S. Kor.). One interesting legal issue raised in those cases 
were whether the salamander itself can have standing to raise suit against the government. 
The court ruled that the salamander itself do not have the legal ability to have standing to 
raise a lawsuit. 
5) Young-woong Park, About the debate on Cheonseongsan Dorongnyong lawsuit, neWsen, 
Jun. 21. 2011, available at  http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_
id=5673142.
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much more complex and it is not easy to find the right answer in modern 
administrative actions. Much of that is because modern administrative 
states have to deal with so-called ‘Risk’ issues. The main point in dealing 
with the risk issues is that government has to make choice under 
uncertainty.6)  The two cases in Korea described above can be also 
categorized as risk issues in modern society.7)  
What is important is that however uncertain it maybe, the governments 
cannot totally run away from making a decision on those risk issues. 
Moreover, the governments have to do their best to make a rational choice 
in policy decision-making choices.
2. Rational choice theory in public law
The analysis of rational choice in market economy is relatively simple 
compared to that in public law area.8)
People generally have no difficulty in taking the assumption that 
market players are seeking the maximization of their self-interest in market 
decisions like consumption and production. 
This utility maximization or welfare maximization assumption has 
difficulty in being equally applied to public law decisions. Much of the 
people who naturally accepted the self-interest maximization assumption 
in market decisions hesitate in accepting the assumption that the public 
agents would also try to maximize their own self-interest in public 
decisions.9)
Quite a lot of people believe or expect that public agents are public 
interest minded people rather than private interest seekers. This difference 
6) About the brief overview of risk in modern society, see Cass r. sunsTein, risK and 
reason – safeTy, laW, and The environmenT -, Cambridge University Press (2002).
7) About the excessive reaction of people against risk (especially when it is unknown) in 
modern society, see Cass r. sunsTein, laWs of fear – Beyond The PreCauTionary PrinCiPle -, 
Cambridge University Press (2005).
8) About the issue of rationality in public law, see Jerry l. mashaW, Greed, Chaos, and 
GovernanCe – usinG PuBliC ChoiCe To imProve PuBliC laW -, Yale University Press (1997) chap. 
3.
9) About the reasoning of the validity of self-interest seeking agent assumption in public 
area, see Geoffrey Brennan and James m. BuChanan, The reason of rules – ConsTiTuTional 
PoliTiCal eConomy -, Cambridge University Press (1985). 
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of perspectives on people behaving in public sphere leads to the different 
categorical theory on public law. One is public interest theory of public law 
and the other is public choice theory of public law.
The public interest theory of public law explains that the reason why we 
need public law in the form of regulation is to correct market failure. The 
public choice theory of public law criticizes the public interest theory that 
there is no logical underpinning in its explanation that the existence of 
market failure naturally brings about the government regulations to cure 
the market failure.10)  
3. Social preference function
As we have seen above, in public law area, it is not easy to find out what 
is rational choice of public policy. It is mainly because modern societies are 
composed of so many people with so many and diverse preferences. In this 
condition, to find out the rational public choice outcome, it is necessary to 
have a social preference function with which to correlate each different set 
of people’s preference to a single communal preference.11)
As a certain society’s total amount of resources can be technically 
calculated (even though it may take a very complex process and a huge 
number of hours), once a coherent and consistent social preference function 
is found, then the rational public choice outcome can be theoretically found. 
The democratic process based upon majority rule is also one example of 
a social preference function most commonly taken in modern democratic 
society. As we all know, it is a way to make communal decisions from each 
people’s different preferences. To build up a more sophisticated way of 
communal decision-making, human beings have historically tried to 
develop better political process and democratic process.12) 
10) About the critical understanding of public law from the public choice theory 
perspective, see daniel a. farBer and PhiliP P. friCKey, laW and PuBliC ChoiCe – a CriTiCal 
inTroduCTion -, The University of Chicago Press (1991).
11) On the issue of finding out the social preference function by collecting social choice 
from individual values, see KenneTh J. arroW, soCial ChoiCe and individual values, Yale 
University Press (1951). 
12) On the issue of understanding democracy from economics perspective, see anThony 
doWns, an eConomiC Theory of demoCraCy, addison-Wesley (1957), manCur olson, The loGiC 
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Picture 113)
However, the Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow has mathematically 
proved that no social preference function can be established without having 
a dictator once it fulfills other minimum requirements (Rationality, Pareto 
principle, Independence from irrelevant factors, Universal applicability) for 
social preference function to function as a social preference function. 
(Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem)14) 
This means that there is no coherent and consistent social preference 
function with which to draw a society’s preference from each individual’s 
different sets of preferences. 
Actually, this is quite a disappointing result. After Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem first showed up in the academic world, many social scientists 
tried to show that the theorem was wrong. However, the more they tried to 
prove the fallacy of the theorem, the more it was found out that the 
theorem was logically perfect.
What is left is to try to build up the second best type of social preference 
of ColleCTive aCTion – PuBliC Goods and The Theory of GrouPs -, Harvard University Press 
(1965).
13) This picture and related explanations are from Seong-Wook Heo, Public Law Theory 
and Public Policy(I) – A Theoretical Foundation of Public Choice Theory as an Analytical Tool for 
Public Law Theory, Korean Journal of laW and eConomiCs Vol. 6 no. 2, at 139 (2009). 
14) arroW, supra note 11.
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function with sacrifice of one or two of the conditions provided above for 
the social preference function to be consistent and coherent.
4. Cost benefit analysis vs. Precautionary principle15) 
As we have discussed above, different from the market equilibrium 
analysis in consumer choice theory, it is not easy to define what rational 
choice means in administrative law.
Now we turn to the story of cost benefit analysis.
Cost benefit analysis (CBA) can be a good anchoring point to discuss 
that topic.
In market analysis, it is naturally agreed upon to have the self-interest 
maximization assumption of market players. On the other hand, in 
analyzing the public law topics, people tend to hesitate to take the self-
interest assumption of public players. Many people try to set something 
apart from just monetary value as a public goal that should be the target to 
be achieved in public arena.
However, it cannot be denied that much of the public goals to be 
achieved in modern society have the property to be calculated and 
compared in terms of utility or welfare.
Actually, in modern administrative state, CBA is becoming quite 
prevalent in evaluating the validity of government regulations. In Korea 
too, the Basic Framing Act on Administrative Regulation (BFAAR) requires 
every administrative agencies to do Regulation Impact Assessment (RIA) 
including CBA when they introduce new or stricter regulations. 
But, the story in real life is not as simple as that statutory provision.
Let’s go back to the two cases in Korea presented in the introduction.
In both cases, the result of CBA and the public people’s response were 
not the same.
In the U.S. beef case, the government CBA analysis showed that 
importing beef from U.S. in cheap price would heighten Korean people’s 
welfare level. In that sense, they thought that they are making a rational 
15) About the description of debate between precautionary principle and cost-benefit 
analysis and the trial to have a more sophisticated understanding of precautionary principle 
in modern risk society, see sunsTein, supra note 7.
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choice in public policy by allowing the import of beef from U.S. But people 
who participated the protest against the government thought in a different 
way. Of course, the politics of mad cow disease protest in 2008 is far more 
complex than just an issue of CBA, but that dramatic event can be 
understood somewhat more easily through the frame of CBA vs. 
Precautionary principle in risk issues. 
In Cheon-seong mountain tunneling case too, the CBA result of 
government showed that tunneling through the mountain is the most 
benefit-cost efficient way of building the KTX route. But monk Jiyul and 
environment group’s ideas were different from that.
The arguments of people who are not agreeing with government CBA 
analysis can be understood in two different reasoning. The first is that the 
high risk of being taken with human mad cow disease is so dangerous that 
its cost side should be more intensively counted. In that case there is no 
guarantee that benefit exceeds cost. The second is that because the value of 
cost side like protecting scarce animals in nature is incalculable and 
incommensurable compared to the monetary benefit side, CBA should not 
be applied in that kind of policy decisions.    
They argue that in dealing with risk issues the government should not 
just follow CBA in their decision-making, and the state is required to do 
whatever measures to prevent the happening of risk.
This tension between CBA and Precautionary principle is another 
battlefield where different thoughts on public rational choice are fighting 
each other.
 
5. Rational choice in democratic process
As Francis Fukuyama once pointed out, the political system of liberal 
democracy can be thought of as the most developed shape of social 
preference function until now, even though it may not be the end of 
history.16)
Including quite many varied versions of voting, the majority voting is 
still the most commonly taken form of collective decision-making process. 
16) franCis fuKuyama, The end of hisTory and The lasT man, Avon Books (1992).
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However, as Condorcet has easily shown, the majority voting system is not 
a perfect one at all. When more than one of the voting participants has 
multi-peaked preference, the cycling of voting outcome would happen, and 
no final decision can be made. 
Then, what is the rational choice in democratic process?
We can think about the two different main ideas on this topic. Pluralism 
is one and Republicanism is the other.
The pluralists claim that because each individual person is as rational in 
his or her public decisions as in market decisions, there is no need for the 
state to intervene into individuals’ decision-making processes. The 
collective result of each individual’s rational choice itself is regarded as the 
rational choice of the community.
On the other hand, the republicans take note at the possibility that each 
individual’s political decision might be defected by irrationality or the 
possibility that each individual’s rational choice might not necessarily be 
lead to the rational choice of the public. In this sense, they argue that the 
rational choice of a society comes not from the pluralistic process but from 
the deliberation process by the representatives of the society who have the 
virtue to be sincerely worried about the better future of the community.
This difference of view on democracy is also affecting how to cope with 
the uncertainty issues in modern administrative law.
The pluralists would argue that whatever it might be, what the public 
desires through democratic political process should be respected as the 
rational choice of that community. On the other hand, the republicans 
would argue that because the respect of political process in democracy is 
not the respect for the blunders of the public but the respect for the sincere 
virtues for the prosperity of the community, the government should not 
just follow the public’s opinion presented through majority voting or 
protest.
It is not easy to directly link this difference of views on democracy to the 
difference of attitude towards the 2008 mad cow disease protest and the 
Cheon-seong mountain hunger strike, but through the lenses of pluralism 
and republicanism, we can better understand the structure of tensions 
between different groups who have different ideas on what is the rational 
choice for our society.
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6. Behavioral biases in people’s choice
Until now, we have discussed the rational choice of modern 
administrative law from several different angles. During the discussions, it 
was implicitly supposed that each people are making their rational choice 
at least individually. What matters was whether each individual’s rational 
choice could be collected to rational choice of the community.
Would that be true in real life?
As Cass Sunstein often cited in many books and papers, the result of 
some empirical study shows that people have tendency to behave 
differently from the result of classical rational choice theory.17) 18)
Here are some of them. In each section of the theories, I will firstly 
overview the contents of the theories briefly and then try to apply those 
theories to the two cases in Korea. 
1) Availability heuristic
People tend to be affected much more strongly from things available 
around them.
For example, when a person is exposed to the news of bird flu from 
media continuously, he or she will think that the risk of bird flu is much 
more higher than other risks less available.
Likewise, it can be easily found that in thinking about risks, people rely 
on certain heuristics, or rule of thumbs, which help them to simplify their 
inquiry.19) In thinking about what to do in risk situations, people commonly 
use the availability heuristic. People assess the magnitude of risks by asking 
whether examples of those risks easily come to mind.20)
17) The basic introduction of those behavioral biases and their application to legal 
analysis are at Cass r. sunsTein, Why soCieTies need dissenT, Harvard University Press (2003). 
The behavioral economics approach to risk is also tried in his later book laWs of fear in 
chapter two: Behind the precautionary principle.
18) The original research on this topic was done by daniel Kahneman, Paul sloviC, and 
amos TversKy at JudGmenT under unCerTainTy: heurisTiC and Biases, Cambridge University 
Press (1982). 
19) sunsTein, supra note 7, at 37.
20) Id.
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The first factor affecting the availability heuristic is ‘familiarity’.
For example, “a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear 
more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less 
retrievable.”21)
According to a simple study of Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and 
Amos tversky, people respond that more names of men were in the list 
when the names of men were more famous than the names of women even 
in the case when the list was composed of equal number of male and 
female celebrities.22)
This study is showing how familiarity can affect the availability of 
instances. A risk that is familiar, like that associated with smoking, will be 
seen as more serious than a risk that is less familiar, like that associated 
with sunbathing.23)
In addition to familiarity, ‘salience’ is also affecting the availability 
heuristic.
According to Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky’s example, the impact of 
seeing a house burning to people is probably greater when the fire is in 
front of their eyes than when they just read the news of fire in the local 
newspaper. In the same logic, recent events will have a greater impact than 
earlier ones.24)
The 2008 mad cow disease protest is one major example of availability 
heuristic.
As mentioned above, Korean people got so much upset about the 
possibility of being taken by mad cow disease right after the MBC program 
was broadcasted. When the Korean people were exposed to the salient 
images of mad cow disease like a sick cow that cannot stand up or an 
interview of a dying girl supposed to be taken by human mad cow disease, 
they came to think that eating U.S. imported beef was a really dangerous 
thing.
The familiar and salient images of mad cow disease made Korean 
21) Kahneman, sloviC, and TversKy, supra, note 18, at 11, recited from sunsTein, supra note 
7, at 36.
22) sunsTein, supra note 7, at 36-37.
23) Id. at 37.
24) Id.
 Rational Choice in Modern Administrative Law   |  231No. 2: 2013
people to rely on availability heuristic in their decision-making.
2) Cascading effect and Group polarization
Certainly, human beings are not sheep.25)  But in real life, human beings 
have tendency to follow other people’s opinion astonishingly often. This 
tendency to follow other people gets stronger when they are faced with 
hard questions rather than easy questions.
Moreover, in uncertainty situations, when quite a number of people 
already shared their views in some way, then it is very easy for a newcomer 
to just follow. Cascading happens. We can find out many examples of 
cascading event in human history. Some of them were good cascading, 
some others of them were quite tragically bad cascading. 
Cascades can involve judgment about either facts or values. They 
happen within legislatures, political parties, religious organizations, and 
the judicial system as well as within diverse groups of citizens in our 
society.26)
Cascades are neither good nor bad by themselves. We can find many 
historical incidents of cascades through which people came to reach sound 
collective conclusion on social movement. The apartheid in South Africa fell 
in part because of a cascade. The downfall of Communism and the civil 
rights movement in the U.S. also showed similar dynamic.27) These are good 
examples of cascades. The problem is that people can converge on 
erroneous or insufficiently justified outcomes through exactly the same 
process.28) And this problem is quite a serious one.
Much of risk issues in modern administrative law are related to 
cascading effect in public decision-making process. In mad cow disease too, 
as the scientific evidence of human mad cow disease was still uncertain, 
people didn’t have objective criteria to decide the issue. In that situation, 
once quite a big number of people got together to share same idea that 
eating U.S. imported beef might put people under the risk of human mad 
cow disease, many other people naturally joined the stream of cascading 
25) sunsTein, Why soCieTies need dissenT, supra note 17, at 54.
26) Id.
27) Id. at 55.
28) Id.
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into the protest against government.
Cascading happens both in informational aspect and in reputational 
aspect.
When people lack the exact information to make decision under 
uncertainty situations, they are well rational to just follow the majority 
opinion already made. In collective wisdom perspective, if each individual 
in the group do their best to make rational choice based upon the full 
information they have, then the collective outcome might be close to the 
best one. However, participants in the cascade might fail to see that the 
blind really are leading the blind – that the decisions of most of their 
predecessors, themselves following others, carry little independent 
information.29)
What is important is how to reduce the risk of bad cascades. It is 
suggested that the more people with professional knowledge on the issue 
are included in the group and the more the social culture of dissenting 
opinion to be freely expressed is cultivated, the risk of bad cascading is 
lessened.
It is an issue with debate still going on in Korea, whether the mad cow 
disease gale was an example of bad cascade. As mentioned in chapter I, the 
producers of MBC program were finally found not guilty at the Supreme 
Court. The Court ruled that even if some factual contents of the program 
were found to be false, it is not a defamation to the public officers doing the 
job of negotiating with U.S. on beef import, because the program was about 
an issue with public and social meaning and the producers have a wider 
range of freedom of speech as media journalists.30) 
However, that does not directly mean that the mad cow disease gale 
was a good cascade or the import of U.S. beef was a bad movement that 
should have been stopped by the brave dissenting opinion of PD sucheop.
Group polarization is also a kind of human bias easily found in group-
thinking process. Group polarization means that people tend to reach more 
polarized conclusion when they deliberate in groups than by themselves. 
This tendency gets stronger when the group is composed of people with 
similar political preferences. This tendency gets weaker when one or more 
29) Id. at 60.
30) Supreme Court [S. Ct], 2010Do17237, Sept. 2, 2011 (S. Kor.). 
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of the people in the group have scientifically exact answers on issues being 
discussed, or when they can freely express their ideas.
A person who simply didn’t like imported beef may turn to become an 
extreme antagonist against U.S. beef after participating the protest gathered 
with quite polarized people against U.S.
3) Probability neglect
As Sunstein mentions, the availability heuristic and the social cascading 
can produce an inaccurate assessment of probability. However, sometimes 
people will attempt little assessment of probability at all, especially when 
strong emotions are involved.31)
In such cases, large-scale variation of probability matters little – even 
when that variation should matter a lot. This happens both in hope side as 
well as fear side. The behavior of people’s buying lottery is an example of 
the hope side probability neglect. However, the fear side probability neglect 
is the main relevance to risk issues.32)
This probability neglect can be easily connected to the precautionary 
principle in risk management. When people fall into the trap of probability 
neglect in salient risk, they focus on one emotionally gripping outcome 
among a large set of possibilities, and this will bring about the excessive 
public concern about certain very low-probability risks.33)
Quite a lot of examples of probability neglect can be found in modern 
risk issues.
In the issue of the risk of dying in airplane crashes, the risk of 
genetically modified food, the risk of climate change etc., people easily tend 
to be neglect about the real probability of the risk’s being realized.
Both in the mad cow disease case and in the Cheon-seong mountain 
case, people in Korea showed the tendency of probability neglect. Even 
though the scientific probability of human being mad cow disease was very 
low or almost close to zero, the people in the protest were defying the 
import of U.S. beef at all. They were not rationally calculating the 
probability of mad cow disease; they were not doing the rational benefit 
31) sunsTein, laWs of fear, supra note 7, at 39.
32) Id.
33) Id.
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cost analysis on the import of U.S. beef; they were simply and emotionally 
rejecting the small – however small it might be – possibility of the risk. The 
citizen group in the Cheon-seong mountain case was acting almost in the 
same way. The people in the group were not rationally calculating the 
probability of the effect of tunneling to the wildlife in that area. They were 
not even accepting the result of the EIA(Environmental Impact 
Assessment). 
The thing is that this probability neglect attitude of people still can have 
much influence on public decision-making through diverse political 
activities.
One main issue in modern administrative law is how to deal with this 
probability neglect but quite influential political voice of people. 
4) Framing effect
Framing effect means that people generally cannot escape the frame 
through which a problem was given. The existence of this framing effect 
tendency was first experimented by psychologists Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman in 1981.34)
The experiment was done by asking questions about a disease 
prevention strategy to quite a large group of people. The first question was 
given to the participants offered with next two options around 600 people 
affected by a hypothetical deadly disease.
- Option A saves 200 people’s lives.
-  Option B has a 33% chance of saving all 600 people and 1 66% chance 
of saving no one.
As we all know very well, these two options have the same expected 
value of saving 200 people, but option B is more risky. About this question, 
72% participants chose option A, whereas only 28% people chose option B. 
The other question, actually the same as the previous one, was framed a 
little bit differently and asked to other group of people.
- If option C is taken, then 400 people die
34) For more detailed academic explanation on framing effect in jury decision-making, see 
Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman, and Matthew L. Spitzer, Framing the Jury: Cognitive 
Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, Behavioral laW & eConomiCs (Edited by Cass R. 
Sunstein), Cambridge University Press (2000), chap. 10.
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-  If option D is taken, then there is a 33% chance that no people will die 
and 66% chance that all 600 people will die
About this question, 78% chose option D that is equivalent to option B, 
whereas only 22% chose option C that is equivalent to option A. This 
experiment shows that according to the frame of question, people’s 
selection of choice differs quite dramatically. If this is true in real life, we 
cannot help but raise a serious question to ourselves what is the rational 
choice in public choice. If people’s choice or preference is indeterminate 
according to the frame under which the issue is raised, then how do we get 
our society’s rational choice that must be based upon individuals’ 
preferences?
It needs some more empirical research to find out how the framing 
effect affected the process of social consensus making in the two Korean 
cases. However, I can roughly suspect that the people in the mad cow 
disease protest received questions about the risk of eating U.S. imported 
beef or the benefit of importing U.S. beef in a different context or in a 
different frame, their answers might have been very different from what 
was shown in the street. 
5) Hindsight bias
Hindsight bias is the psychological inclination to think events already 
occurred as being more predictable than they were before they took place.35)
This hindsight bias can also affect the risk measurement and risk policy.
In evaluating a certain policy measure related to risk, it is important to 
measure the possibility of the risk events. Because risks are all around us in 
many different shapes and it is impossible to take precautionary measures 
against all those risks, we need to decide which risk to be first dealt with 
and which risk to be dealt with later. In making that decision, it is crucial to 
consider the possibility of each risk’s occurrence.  
However, if the possibility of each risk’s occurrence is calculated 
differently between before and after the risk events, then there should be 
some problem in evaluating the validity of risk management policy. We can 
35) For more detailed academic explanation on hindsight bias, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A 
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, Behavioral laW & eConomiCs, supra note 
34, chap. 3.
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see the 2011 Japan nuclear power plant accident as an example of hindsight 
bias. Before the accident occurred, not many people expected that such a 
big blow of tsunami would hit Fukushima area and let the sea water pour 
into the power plant. The professional knowledge was that the power plant 
wall was well built highly enough to protect the power plant against 
whatever possible natural blow. But once the tsunami strong enough to 
damage the power plant hit the plant and nuclear accident happened, 
many people not just in Japan but also many other people in worldwide fell 
into despair and began to blame Japanese government and the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company for not taking enough precautionary measures 
against the accident. In that situation, as people already witnessed the 
occurrence of the nuclear accident, they tend to think more highly of the 
possibility of the accident than before it took place. This is a major example 
of hindsight bias.
As we have seen above, the hindsight bias is a real factor affecting 
people’s decision-making processes. And this is another reason why 
classical rational choice theory cannot fully explain people’s behavior in 
reality. 
For the modern administrative law to be more developed and 
sophisticated, it should be able to encompass these kinds of newly 
researched topics too.  
III. For the Sophistication of Modern Administrative Law
1. Introduction
Compared to the tradit ional private law area, the modern 
administrative laws in each country are quite dynamic and are under a 
bigger challenge because it has to deal with many issues newly raised in 
modern society. The topics discussed above are the basic conceptual tools 
to understand and enforce the rational choice in modern administrative law 
and policy. 
The administrative law system should be also more sophisticated to 
encompass the interdisciplinary studies results. For the sophistication of 
modern administrative law, public law scholars should be more open-
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minded and should be able to view administrative legal system outside 
from the traditional Dogmatiks.
Followings are several topics to think about in relation to the 
sophistication of modern administrative law. 
2. Democracy vs. technocracy
One issue we are always faced with when studying administrative law 
is how to coordinate the roles of democracy and technocracy in public 
decision-making process.
In dealing with risk problems, when the public demands expressed 
through democratic process differ from the scientific CBA result done by 
technocrats, what should be the rational choice of the society?  This was the 
story in the two cases in Korea in the introduction. 
It is not that easy to find out the right answer to this question. The 
answer may differ country by country, and it will also depend upon the 
historical development level of democracy in each country. If a country’s 
democratic process is relatively well functioning and each people’s rational 
choices are successfully collected as community’s rational choice, then it 
would be better much of public decisions to be made through democratic 
process rather than technocratic process. However, if a country’s 
democratic process is failing because of reasons found through public 
choice theory analysis like interest group theory, etc., then, we can expect 
that the professional knowledge of technocrats would protect the society 
from falling into the bad cascading.
3. Information sharing and citizen participation
There is no need to stress out the importance of information sharing in 
rational choice not just in individual level but also in public policy making 
level.
Many country’s administrative processes already have introduced the 
procedure for the information distribution in the society. But, considering 
the findings of behavioral irrationality of people, more information sharing 
system should be researched and established for the sophistication of 
administrative law. In addition to that, citizen participation into 
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administration chances should be enlarged. While participating the 
administrative process, people can get more exact information on 
administrative issues. This will firstly help those individual people who 
participated into the process of deliberation to make more rational choice. 
Furthermore, when our society comes to have enough people who have 
enough information to make more rational choice, then they will help again 
our society not to fall into the collective behavioral biases like cascading, 
group polarization, hindsight bias, etc.
In relation to that, when information is adequately shared by society’s 
constituents, then that will also help soft law rather than hard law to do 
more functioning to lead our society to more collective rational choice.
4. Interdisciplinary study of administrative law  
It is a little bit cautious but I can roughly say that the atmosphere of 
interdisciplinary study of public law including administrative law is quite a 
common academic way of studying in many advanced counties like U.S., 
but many countries including Korea still have a long way to go.
As I discussed all through this paper, to do the logical studying of 
rational choice in administrative law, it is very essential to have basic 
understanding of economic reasoning, positive politics theory, and 
psychological studying including the field of behavioral economics. The 
traditional legal study of Dogmatiks and theoretical interpretive study of 
law will maintain their status as the foundation of legal study heuristics, 
but that’s not enough.
For modern administrative law to adequately cope with the newly 
presented risk issues in modern society, it is very essential that it should be 
able to accept and ut i l ize the academic research outcome of 
interdisciplinary studying.
IV. Conclusion
For the sophisticated study of modern administrative law, it is essential 
to be interested in the topic of rational choice in public law. The way to find 
out the proper administrative measures against modern risk issues is the 
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way to try to find out the mechanism to reach to the communal rational 
choice based upon individual’s rational choice.
In this paper, I began my discussion with the two major cases in Korea 
in which the rational choices of the public were very much debated. I tried 
to show the difference between the rational choice of individuals in market 
and the rational choice of public sphere, and then share the basic 
understanding that the trial to find out a way to reach to the communal 
rational choice is the trial to find out the social preference function of that 
society. The insight of the Arrow’s impossibility theorem is quite 
meaningful to modern administrative law in building up a better 
mechanism to get public rational choice in risk issues. The debate between 
precautionary principle and CBA is also one important chapter in thinking 
about rational choice in administrative law. The understanding of different 
views on democracy between pluralism and republicanism, the different 
roles of democracy and technocracy is also very essential part of the study. 
And, the research achievement of behavioral economics is also giving us 
great insights to help us better understand the reality of group decision-
making processes. 

